India's recent operationalisation of its maritime nuclear leg, with at least 12 warheads deployed on its SSBN fleet, marks a perilous turning point for South Asia. India's shift to a “canisterised” posture, with pre-mated warheads at high readiness, compresses decision-making windows from hours to minutes, or even seconds. For scholars and practitioners working on the nuclear order, it is critical to understand these destabilising developments.
Dual-Capable Delivery Systems and Warhead Entanglement
India's reliance on dual-capable delivery systems (DCDS) creates a warhead entanglement nightmare. While DCDS offer operational flexibility and cost efficiency, they severely complicate regional deterrence. This ambiguity risks inadvertent escalation, as adversaries may misinterpret conventional missile salvos as pre-emptive nuclear strikes. During a crisis, distinguishing between conventionally armed and nuclear-tipped missiles during the boost phase is technically impossible.
In 2022, a BrahMos missile from India struck Pakistan. India called it a misfire. Even if that were the case, several question marks were raised regarding India's command and control capabilities to safeguard its critical infrastructure and strategic programmes. After the BrahMos was fired, Pakistan's mature and rational decision-making prevented a strategic crisis in the region. In a canisterised, sea-based environment with pre-mated warheads, similar failures risk launching active nuclear weapons and may lead to a nuclear catastrophe. This combination of flawed command and control, together with ready-to-use nuclear missiles, makes India a potent danger to world peace.
The Always-Never Paradox at Sea
Moreover, the strategic dilemma of deploying live nuclear assets on Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs) revolves around the core stringency in nuclear command and control (C2) theory known as the “Always-Never” paradox: a state must ensure that its nuclear weapons will always launch when authorised by the proper command, but never launch without that authorisation. At sea, this paradox manifests itself as a precarious balance between centralised political authority and operational survivability. India's doctrine of deploying live assets on SSBNs introduces pre-delegation dilemmas. A cornered SSBN during a conventional naval conflict faces acute “use-it-or-lose-it” pressures.
India's deployment blurs the line between conventional anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and counterforce targeting, leading to inadvertent escalation. In an era of cognitive biases, dominance, and warfare, any misperception, especially in the absence of communication links, can create powerful structural incentives for immediate pre-emptive nuclear escalation. India's track record regarding the safety and security of its strategic assets indicates that South Asia cannot afford the possibility of communication degradation between India's SSBNs and the National Command Authority, resulting in the shifting of weapon-release authority to shipboard command during any crisis.
India's Irresponsible State Behaviour
A few examples of India being an irresponsible state actor from recent history are as follows: following the indictments by the U.S. Department of Justice concerning a foiled murder-for-hire plot against a Sikh separatist leader in New York, the findings of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) attributed the architecture of the plot to “rogue operatives” or unauthorised government employees acting outside their official mandate. The MEA explicitly noted that such actions were “contrary to government policy”. When a nuclear-capable BrahMos supersonic cruise missile was launched into Pakistan, Indian officials attributed the event entirely to a “technical malfunction” during routine maintenance, resulting in the dismissal of three Air Force officers.
International defence analysts and regional adversaries have often raised concerns about the potential infiltration of ultra-nationalist ideologies into India's nuclear command and control systems. Radioactive substances such as uranium ore, yellowcake, or depleted uranium are available on the Indian black market and are regularly confiscated by Indian agencies. India's poor performance in curbing radical Hindutva elements within its strategic and military establishment can lead the region towards destruction.
Unsafeguarded Reactors and Ideological Shifts
Unlike the restraint demonstrated by the commander of the Soviet submarine B-59 flotilla, India's ideological shifts and institutional hyper-nationalism reduce the probability of such restraint. Indian military and paramilitary officers have been implicated by human rights organisations and state investigations in multiple high-casualty incidents, extrajudicial executions, and mass shootings. While systemic accountability is frequently constrained by legal protections such as the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), specific instances involving Indian officers and units have been documented by bodies such as Human Rights Watch and the United Nations. The accused in the Samjhauta Express bombing, which occurred on 18 February 2007 and resulted in the deaths of 68 passengers, the majority of whom were Muslims and Pakistani nationals, were acquitted despite being Right-wing Hindutva radicals.
After Operation Sindoor in May 2025, India's NSA stated that it had been launched to avenge their ancestors. Such factual, philosophical, and doctrinal evolution needs the attention of world leaders before it is too late. In an era of cognitive biases, dominance, and warfare, any misperception, especially in the absence of communication links, can create powerful structural incentives for immediate pre-emptive nuclear escalation. The dense fog of war and crisis surrounding submerged SSBNs increases the risk of miscalculation in future India–Pakistan conflicts. India's transition towards a continuously deployed maritime nuclear posture would negatively affect regional crisis stability by introducing systemic vulnerabilities while undermining traditional deterrence. The nuclearisation of the Indian Ocean raises serious questions about the credibility of India's No First Use pledge.
