According to the latest annual report from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India has for the first time deployed 12 of its 190 nuclear weapons, mating nuclear warheads to delivery systems. This dangerous escalatory step of vertical nuclear proliferation impacts deterrence dynamics in South Asia and undermines regional strategic stability.
Pakistan's Response and Monitoring
The Foreign Office stated that this development is not surprising for Pakistan, which has closely monitored India's irresponsible behavior since its first naval deterrence patrol in 2019 with canisterised nuclear warheads on its nuclear-powered submarine, INS Arihant. That naval exercise demonstrated India's credible sea-based second-strike capability. Now, India has gone further by deploying up to 12 nuclear warheads, possibly on all three of its nuclear-powered submarines, contradicting its self-proclaimed deterrence posture based on recessed or de-mated nuclear capability.
Contradictions in Nuclear Posture
Ironically, such nuclear escalation collides with claims by Indian and Western defense experts that the relevance of nuclear deterrence in South Asia has reduced since India has been able to exploit space below the nuclear threshold to conduct military operations against Pakistan, as in February 2019 and May 2025. It is alleged that India has called Pakistan's nuclear bluff and rejected its nuclear blackmail. These assertions are consistent with India's search for space for conventional war below the nuclear threshold since the 1998 nuclear tests neutralized India's numerical advantage in conventional weapons.
Cold Start Doctrine and Full Spectrum Deterrence
India's Cold Start doctrine, envisaging multiple integrated conventional attacks, was adopted to re-establish the salience of its conventional weapons asymmetry. However, Cold Start has been effectively countered by Pakistan's Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) at operational, tactical, and strategic levels. Consequently, India has opted for sub-conventional terrorist operations and limited skirmishes, as in 2019 and 2025, which Pakistan has rebuffed with conventional capabilities. In both cases, India demonstrated restraint and sought a ceasefire, enforced by Pakistan's credible nuclear deterrence.
Escalation Risks and New Weapon Systems
Another argument downgrading nuclear deterrence is that both sides employed new weapon systems such as missiles, drones, and stand-off precision weapons, making resort to nuclear weapons remote. However, this ignores the danger of entanglement between conventional and nuclear forces. AI-assisted target selection and domain awareness increase lethality, placing combatants on an escalation elevator rather than a ladder, far faster and harder to de-escalate. Dual-purpose weapons, like India's BrahMos cruise missiles (also a nuclear delivery vector), were used irresponsibly; in March 2022, India launched a BrahMos missile against Pakistan allegedly by mistake. With deployed nuclear warheads, such a launch could have catastrophic consequences. Pakistan's restraint kept its Babar and Shaheen missiles unused in the 2025 crisis, and it is developing a conventional rocket force distinct from strategic missiles.
Critical Dangers and Lack of Crisis Management
Repeated exploitation of space below the nuclear threshold can trigger unintended escalation based on misperception, leading to nuclear weapons use. This is especially dangerous given the lack of crisis management or fail-safe mechanisms between the two countries, except for a hotline between the Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMOs). Reaction time is just three minutes. Therefore, nuclear deterrence remains critical for strategic stability in South Asia. Any deviation makes war more, not less, likely.
India's Objectives: Prestige or First Strike?
India's deployment raises questions about its objectives. One explanation is prestige. India may argue it deters China, but Chinese capabilities are much greater, and India cannot risk confrontation with China. Thus, the deployment is aimed against Pakistan. Former Indian officials have spoken of developing a disarming first strike capability against Pakistan and shifting from its No First Use policy. Indian-origin American scholar Vipin Narang has advocated an Indian first strike after achieving effective second-strike capability via naval platforms. None of these assertions have been officially denied, suggesting Indian nuclear deployments aim to re-establish conventional advantage by achieving pre-emptive first strike capability and preventing Pakistan from resorting to FSD.
Pakistan's Necessary Response
Pakistan's credible second-strike capability should dissuade India from such options. To counter India's delusions, Pakistan should consider its own nuclear deployment, enhance its sea-based second strike capability, and seamlessly integrate its FSD nuclear capabilities at operational, tactical, and strategic levels with enhanced conventional capabilities such as rocket force, drones, precision guided munitions, stand-off weapons, cyber systems, and other emerging technologies. While avoiding a quantitative arms race, Pakistan must quickly adapt to the challenging dynamics of deterrence in South Asia.
