Eight years after the 25th Constitutional Amendment of 2018 merged the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the promise of full integration remains unfulfilled. The amendment aimed to transform the region by replacing the colonial-era Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) with regular institutions. However, the window of opportunity closed abruptly in August 2021, when NATO withdrew from Afghanistan and the Taliban returned to power. The Taliban's resurgence did not create a vacuum in the merged districts; it exposed one that had never been filled.
Historical Governance Under FCR
Before the merger, the tribal belt was governed under the FCR, a system of collective punishment, administrative detention, and discretionary justice that lasted over a century. Pakistan maintained this exceptional legal status from 1947 to 2018. The 25th Amendment formally abolished the FCR and extended the Constitution to the region, but institutional change has barely begun.
Rising Militancy Since 2021
Since 2021, insurgent attacks have increased dramatically in the merged districts and across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, spilling into cities like Islamabad and Karachi. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has resurged, targeting security forces, tribal elders, and civilian administrators. Other groups, including Jamaat-ul-Ahrar in Bajaur and Mohmand, and the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), have maintained separate command structures, creating a fragmented security landscape. In 2025, there were over 1,600 attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa—a 48% increase from the previous year and the highest in recent years.
Daily Reality for Locals
Ibrahim Shinwari, a senior journalist covering the merged districts, described the situation: "In Khyber, my home district, we cannot travel after sunset, not even me, despite being both a local resident and a journalist." He added: "People are deeply concerned about the deteriorating security situation, but their frustrations extend beyond that... There is also growing distrust of the current government's perceived failure to prioritize the development of the merged districts."
Failure of Peace Jirga in Bajaur
In August 2024, Bajaur district—a former tribal agency bordering Afghanistan—saw an escalation in militant attacks and killings of tribal elders. The administration convened a peace jirga, but talks collapsed when militants refused to surrender weapons or concede territory. Attacks resumed within days. The episode revealed not the failure of the jirga but the absence of any alternative: no police investigation, no prosecutor, and no court for the community to turn to.
Institutional Gaps: Police, Courts, Land Records
The conversion of Levies and Khassadars into a regular police force was legislated in 2019, but nearly 29,000 personnel were absorbed without adequate training, equipment, or investigative capacity. Successive federal budgets have had to allocate billions of rupees for police stations and posts. Regular courts now function in every merged district, but often in makeshift premises—for example, a former girls' college in Miranshah serves as a judicial complex. Purpose-built complexes remain unfinished, some judicial officers hear cases from adjoining districts, and citizens must travel outside their districts for justice. Case disposal is slow, and prosecutions are low. Land records, whose absence fuels conflict, still await systematic settlement as required under the merger. Local governments remain the weakest link.
Financial Promises Unfulfilled
The merger included a financial commitment: 3% of the national divisible pool for ten years—roughly 100 billion rupees annually—to finance institutions. However, this promise has largely gone unfulfilled. Some provinces, notably Sindh and Balochistan, resisted surrendering their share. The National Finance Commission (NFC) Award has not been revised to reflect the merger, leaving the country operating under an expired 2015 formula. According to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government, of the approximately 360 billion rupees due by 2024, much never arrived. Fiscal default underlies the institutional stall.
Security Operations vs. Institution Building
Provincial police have requested an additional eight billion rupees to complete security infrastructure schemes in the merged districts, after nearly all development funds were spent before projects could finish. The need is real, but the urgent diverts funds from the important: operations consume money, jirgas absorb disputes, and institutions like judiciary, police, and local government are postponed. The security policy sequence—clear, hold, build, transfer—has been repeated at great cost for clearing and holding, but building has not begun, and transfer to civilian institutions has yet to occur.
Role of Jirgas and Formal Justice
Community dispute resolution through jirgas remains popular because it is quicker and cheaper. Shafiq Shinwari, a local businessman, noted that jirgas offer "no right of appeal," unlike formal courts, but many people rely on them because the formal system is slow and inaccessible. Malik Abdul Razaq Afridi, interviewed for research, said people take even family and property matters to jirgas because there is "no other effective alternative." However, there is a difference between choosing mediation and having no court worth approaching. The first is a right; the second is a denial.
Youth Expectations
Interviews with young people in the merged districts suggest that patience will not last. These educated, connected youth know their constitutional rights. They respect their riwaj (customs) but do not accept that tradition should cost them the institutions every other Pakistani district takes for granted.
Way Forward
Solutions are known: complete the police transition properly; release the eight billion rupees but tie it to a published, time-bound plan for police stations, training, and investigative capacity; bring justice physically into districts through judicial complexes, prosecutors, legal aid, and settlement of land records; link jirgas and dispute resolution councils to courts and police, with safeguards for women and vulnerable groups, voluntary participation, and the right to appeal. The aim is not to displace what people trust but to ensure there is always something more to offer. A merger that exists in the Constitution but not in the courthouse, police station, or land records is incomplete. Eight years after the 25th Amendment, citizenship for most people in the merged districts remains mainly on paper.
